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Abstract 
 
This paper presents evidence of the ability of poor households in Colombia to insure 
consumption against idiosyncratic and covariate risks. Using longitudinal data from Familias 
en Acción (FA), a conditional cash transfer program (CCT) in Colombia, we test the 
predictions of the Pareto full risk-sharing model and estimate the parameters of a partial 
insurance model. Although we reject the hypothesis of full insurance, our results suggest there 
is a level of risk sharing in these communities, supporting the partial insurance model. In 
addition, we evaluate the effectiveness of FA as a risk management mechanism for beneficiary 
households. We find that the program serves not only as an instrument for consumption 
smoothing, but also for income smoothing. Particularly, FA is effective in protecting food 
consumption but not nonfood consumption, and it reduces consumption fluctuations in 
response to idiosyncratic shocks but not to covariate shocks.  
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Chapter 1 CCT PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMPTION INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM 
COLOMBIA 
 
1. Introduction 
Poor households in developing countries live with high levels of risk and limited 
access to formal financial systems for credit and insurance. To secure their levels of 
consumption, or smooth consumption, households have traditionally engaged in different 
ex-post risk coping strategies; i.e., depletion of assets, increase of labor supply, informal 
borrowing, or transfers from relatives. Also, risk-averse households can take ex-ante 
actions to mitigate the effects of negative income shocks; i.e., income smoothing. However, 
neither of these alternatives allows poor households to achieve an optimal allocation of 
risk across time, and most of these strategies are costly in terms of long-term poverty and 
vulnerability. In particular, ex-post consumption smoothing strategies might result in 
households’ decreased capital accumulation, and the income-smoothing mechanism might 
result in reduced investments in productive assets. Thus, the inability of households to 
cope with risk is a channel through which they can get into a poverty trap. For these 
reasons, the research on risk coping behavior and consumption smoothing arrangements 
of poor communities in developing countries is a crucial issue in the formulation of policies 
aimed to reduce poverty. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze the degree of consumption 
insurance of poor households in Colombia in relation to fluctuations in their incomes due 
to idiosyncratic and community shocks. Second, we evaluate the effects that a conditional 
cash transfer program (CCTs), Familias en Acción (FA), has had on protecting households 
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from the negative effects of shocks. By doing this, we hope to contribute to the literature of 
consumption smoothing in developing countries as well as to provide new evidence of the 
role of CCTs as risk management instruments. A good understanding of how and which 
public interventions provide effective insurance is crucial for policy design.  
Economics literature has broadly studied how individuals smooth consumption in 
response to income shocks. Two main hypotheses have dominated the literature. On one 
hand, the full risk-sharing hypothesis assumes that consumption is fully insured against 
idiosyncratic income shocks but not against community income shocks. On the other hand, 
the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) assumes that, under complete credit markets, self-
insurance through borrowing and saving may allow inter-temporal consumption 
smoothing against idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Although both hypotheses have been 
rejected repeatedly (e.g., Townsend 1994, Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997, Deaton 1992, 
Skoufias 2003), empirical evidence has shown that consumption reacts too little to 
permanent income shocks to be consistent with the economic theory (Campbell & Deaton, 
1989; Attanasio & Pavoni, 2006). Because these models are extreme characterizations of 
individual and market behavior, recent literature has addressed the issue of whether 
partial consumption insurance is available to agents. This paper, in addition to following 
the traditional approach of testing the hypotheses of complete consumption insurance, 
estimates partial insurance parameters from the data following the model of partial 
insurance proposed by Blundell et al. (2008). 
In addition to identifying the relationship between consumption smoothing and 
income shocks, we spend special attention on how public interventions—CCTs, in 
particular—can play a significant role in reducing consumption vulnerability of poor 
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households. According to Morduch (1999), CCTs guarantee that a minimum of insurance is 
received in order to compensate for under-provision of safety-net services in poor areas. 
There are several ways in which we can expect CCT programs to reduce the risk of 
vulnerability: They can (1) reduce income fluctuations because they increase income 
irrespective of shocks and thus have the same insurance properties as permanent income; 
(2) displace non-desirable coping strategies, such as high-interest loans, child labor, or 
depletion of productive assets; (3) create a regulatory and institutional framework to scale 
up services through informal safety nets; and (4) counteract the government’s incapacity to 
respond at state and local levels (Cox & Jimenez, 1992).  
FA provides subsidies to families on the conditions that all household members 
receive periodic health check and that all children are enrolled in and attend school 
regularly. Given the importance of the program at a national level, a rigorous impact 
evaluation design has been followed since the very early stages of the program. This has 
allowed for the collection of repeated observations of beneficiary households surveyed 
before and after the implementation of the program, as well as the collection of similar data 
from comparable households that have not been covered by the program. Thus, this panel 
dataset provides an excellent opportunity for measuring consumption insurance and 
reveals possible roles of public interventions as risk management instruments.This study 
has some advantages over other similar studies because of the quasi-experimental design 
of the program it studies and because of the comprehensive data collected from the 
program’s evaluation survey. First, the balanced panel dataset has detailed information on 
consumption, income, and shocks for a representative sample of poor households living in 
small villages in Colombia. Most of the datasets used in earlier studies to evaluate 
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consumption smoothing report either income or consumption, not both. For example, in 
order to estimate partial insurance parameters for the United States, Blundell et al. (2008) 
have to infer consumption statistically, since consumption and income data are not 
available for the same households in a single dataset.  
Second, while some studies use changes in income as measures of shocks (Skoufias, 
2003; Townsend, 2004), others use dummy variables for the occurrence of idiosyncratic 
shocks in a given period of time (Cochane, 1991; Mace, 1991). Although income has been 
criticized as a right hand side variable since it can be endogenous in the consumption 
equation (Cochane, 1991), if we are able to control for that endogeneity, income variance at 
household and community levels are very informative about the degree of consumption 
insurance of poor households. Furthermore, as frequency and intensity of shock events are 
difficult to capture in occurrence shocks data, a better understanding of the vulnerability to 
shocks is obtained when we are able to complement these results using income variance 
and shock events as measures of the risk faced by these households. The dataset used in 
this analysis uses both income variance and shock events to estimate consumption 
insurance parameters. Finally, as we have data for treatment and control households 
before the program was implemented, we are able to estimate an unbiased effect of the 
program on consumption smoothing, controlling for any pretreatment differences, and for 
time variant differences at the municipality level.  
This paper makes three important contributions to the existing literature. First, it 
adds to the empirical literature on consumption insurance by providing evidence of the 
ability of poor households in Colombia to insure consumption against idiosyncratic and 
covariate shocks. Prior evidence of consumption smoothing has been limited to results 
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from a particular Indian dataset1 and a few other samples collected mainly in Asia and 
Africa. Latin America, a region with a massive proportion of people living in poverty who 
are subject to income shocks, is clearly underrepresented in this literature, in large part 
due to the lack of suitable information for investigating risk and insurance of poor 
households. Second, it contributes to the social program evaluation literature by going 
beyond assessing the impact of the program on its main objectives to analyze the 
consequences of participation in other dimensions, such as the degree of informal risk 
sharing. Third, it is the first paper, to our knowledge, that compares consumption 
insurance parameters under both the full risk-sharing model and a partial insurance model.  
Based on all specifications used in this research, we reject the hypothesis of 
complete consumption insurance and support predictions of the partial insurance model. 
We observe a high, but not complete, level of consumption smoothing among poor 
households in small villages in Colombia, with food consumption’s being better insured 
than nonfood consumption. In addition, results suggest that FA has been effective as a risk 
management instrument protecting food consumption when households are faced by 
income shocks and has not displaced risk pooling among households in the same 
communities. These findings provide strong indications that households engage in risk 
management strategies aimed at insulating, at least partially, consumption changes from 
income changes. For instance, our results suggest that the introduction of this program 
might has enforced the use of savings and assets and has displaced transfers as informal 
risk-sharing arrangements. If FA have in fact crowd-out or enforce existing informal risk 
coping strategies and the final well being of beneficiary households are issues not 
                                                          
1 A pool of cross-sectional data for the period 1975–1984 from the International Crops Research Institute of 
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). 
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addressed on this paper. Finally, we conclude that FA, despite not being a consumption 
insurance program, helps treated families to smooth consumption. Results are robust to 
different specifications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview 
of the program and a description of the evaluation sample used for the empirical analysis. 
The subsequent section examines risks faced by households in rural Colombia and 
describes the data used for the empirical analysis. Following is a section that presents basic 
predictions of the full risk-sharing model and the influential findings on risk coping 
behavior and consumption smoothing arrangements in developing economies. The next 
section contains the empirical model and results for the full insurance model. The two 
subsequent sections present the model used in this paper to estimate partial insurance 
parameters based on both Blundell et al.’s (2008) and this study’s estimations, respectively. 
The following section presents an analysis of risk coping strategies used by households to 
buffer adverse income shocks, and the final section reports the conclusions and makes 
suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Familias en Acción 
The program Familias en Acción is a welfare program run by the Colombian 
government to foster the accumulation of human capital in rural Colombia. It is similar to 
other CCT programs, such as Progresa, in Mexico (now called Oportunidades); Red de 
Proteccion Social, in Nicaragua; and Bolsa Familia, in Brazil, that have been implemented in 
middle-income countries during the last decade in an effort to break the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty. The FA program is aimed primarily at improving the education, 
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health, and nutrition of poor families. The nutrition component consists of a basic 
monetary supplement that is given to all beneficiary families with children under seven 
years of age. The health component consists of vaccinations and growth and development 
checks for children, as well as courses on nutrition, hygiene, and contraception for their 
mothers. Participation in the health component is a precondition for receiving the benefits 
of the nutritional component. All children between 7 and 18 years old are eligible for the 
educational component. To receive the grant, they must attend classes during at least 85% 
of the school days in each school month as well as during the whole academic year. The size 
of the grant increases for secondary education and is equal for girls and boys. The amount 
of the subsidy on a monthly basis at the time of the baseline survey was 14,000 Colombian 
pesos (COP) or (US$6) for each child attending primary school and COP$28,000 or (US$12) 
for each child attending secondary school in 2005. The nutritional supplement2 is paid to 
families with children aged between 0 and 6 years. The amount is COP$46,500 or (US$20) 
per family per month. The average transfer received per household is COP$61,500, which 
represents approximately 25% of average household income of beneficiary households. In 
general, all the transfers are received by the female head of the household every two 
months.  
Familias en Acción determined household eligibility in two stages: first by 
identifying target communities and then by choosing low-income households within those 
communities. Selection criteria for target communities were based on the following 
conditions. The town must: (i) have fewer than 100,000 inhabitants and not be a 
                                                          
2 This subsidy is an alternative to participation in a pre-existing program called Hogares Comunitarios. 
Beneficiaries cannot participate in both programs with the same children. However, families with children 
both under and over the age of 6 can choose to send the young children to a Hogar Comunitario and to 
participate in FA with the older children. 
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departmental capital, (ii) have sufficient education and health infrastructures, (iii) have a 
bank, and (iv) have a municipality administrative office with relatively up-to-date welfare 
lists and other official documents deemed important. A subset of 622 of the 1,060 
Colombian municipalities qualified for the program. Eligible households were those 
registered at SISBEN3 level 1 at the end of December 1999, with children under 17 years 
old, living in the target municipalities. SISBEN 1 households account for roughly the lowest 
quintile of Colombia’s household income distribution (Attanasio, 2004). 
The program started operating in the latter half of 2002.4 It has benefited 
approximately 1,500,000 households since its beginning, and the cost has ascended to the 
sum of 300 thousands of millions of Colombian pesos annually (US$150 million). The cost 
of the program corresponds to the 0.5% of the Colombian GDP and represents 
approximately 10% of educational expenditures in the country.  
 
The Evaluation Sample 
For evaluation purposes, it was decided to construct a representative stratified 
sample of treatment municipalities and to choose control municipalities among those that 
were excluded from the program but that belonged within the same strata. The strata were 
determined by region and by an index of infrastructure based on health and education. The 
control towns were chosen within the same stratum to be as similar as possible to each of 
the treatment towns, in terms of population, area, and quality of life index. Most of the 
control municipalities were towns with basic school and health infrastructures but without 
                                                          
3 SISBEN, Sistema Unificado de Beneficiarios, is a six-level poverty indicator used in Colombia to target 
welfare programs and for the pricing of utilities. 
4 In a few municipalities the program started as early as the end of 2001.  
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banks or, in the few cases chosen to match relatively large municipalities, just over 100,000 
inhabitants. As a consequence, control towns are broadly comparable to treatment towns 
(Attanasio, 2004). In the end, the evaluation sample was made up of 122 municipalities, 57 
of which were treatment and 65 of which were controls.  
For each municipality, approximately 100 eligible households were included in the 
evaluation sample. The total evaluation sample consists of 11,462 households interviewed 
between June and October 2002 (baseline survey), 10,742 households interviewed 
between July and November 2003 (first wave), and 9,566 households interviewed between 
November 2005 and April 2006 (second wave). The attrition rate between the three 
rounds was approximately 16%.5 The final longitudinal data used in this study include 
information from 6,519 repeated households, after excluding households that received 
payments before the baseline survey and households located in control municipalities6 that 
received payments during the second survey.  
At the household level, the sample consists of families that are potential 
beneficiaries of the program—that is, households with children from the poorest sector of 
society. Data are collected at both the household and the individual level. The available data 
provide a rich set of variables that allows us to measure consumption of durables and non-
durables, family composition, household socio-demographic structure, labor supply, 
nutritional status of children, education, household assets, income, and different shocks to 
income, for both rural and urban households. 
 
                                                          
5
 According to Attanasio (2007),  observations lost are not related to the program. 
6 A total of 13 municipalities of the control sample were converted to treatment municipalities in 2005, before 
the second wave of the evaluation survey. 
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3. Empirical Evidence on Risk and Consumption 
Shocks 
The variables used to identify the various shocks experienced by households are 
obtained from direct questions in the evaluation survey. In each of the three survey rounds, 
the household was asked whether during the last year it had experienced any of the 
following shocks: crop loss or job loss, death of a household member, illness of any 
household member, violent attack or displacement, or weather shock.7 We include an 
additional shock, unemployment of the household head, which takes a value of one if the 
household head were looking for a job for more than three months during the year 
previous to the survey. In that way, we expect to capture a severe income shock. Although 
unemployment can be endogenous, I found that the program doesn’t provide incentives to 
reduce labor supply of parents, which is discussed in another chapter of this dissertation. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper we assume that our measure of unemployment 
shocks is not endogenous.  
For the sample of households in treatment and control municipalities, the 
prevalence of different types of shocks at the household level during each of the cross-
section surveys are reported in Table 1. As we observe, there is no statistical difference 
between treatment and control households for all of the shocks, except for illness during 
the first round. This could suggest that participation in the program could decrease the 
vulnerability to disease shocks. However, this shock could be endogenous, especially for 
children, as the program imposes regular visits to health centers as a condition for 
receiving part of the transfers (Attanasio, 2004). To avoid such endogeneity, we improve 
                                                          
7
 Fire, floods, or other catastrophic events. 
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the data by identifying illness for each household member and measuring its intensity. In 
that way, we distinguish between illnesses of children, which can be very endogenous, and 
illnesses of the household head and other adults, which should be less endogenous. We find 
that illness of the household head is not statistically different between treatment and 
control municipalities, suggesting that it is an exogenous shock, while illness of children 
and spouse are correlated with the program and so might be endogenous.  
Data show that the exposure of households to crop loss and unemployment of 
household head is very high: over 10% of households had at least one crop loss and over 
5% had at least one member unemployed for more than 3 months during the year previous 
to the interview. Around 11% of the households reported having the household head ill for 
more than two weeks at least once over the year prior to the survey. Death of any 
household member, being a victim of violence, and weather shocks are less frequent but 
can be very harmful to poor families because they result not only in loss of income but also 
in increased household expenditures.  
Table 1. Frequency of Idiosyncratic Shocks 
 Crop loss Unemployment, 
HH head 
Death, HH 
member 
Weather Violence 
Baseline 
Control 11.39% 5.20% 1.81% 1.55% 1.16% 
Treatment 9.58% 5.14% 2.01% 0.95% 1.02% 
T-test (p value) 0.483 0.777 0.709 0.615 0.808 
1st wave 
Control 12.66% 5.47% 1.81% 1.06% 0.95% 
Treatment 13.50% 4.93% 2.54% 1.25% 1.48% 
T-test (p value) 0.545 0.323 0.085 0.913 0.136 
2nd wave 
Control 12.25% 5.87% 2.09% 5.95% 1.50% 
Treatment 13.67% 5.61% 2.39% 5.57% 1.89% 
T-test (p value) 0.563 0.193 0.598 0.469 0.536 
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Continue… 
 Illness Illness, HH head Illness, partner Illness, children 
Baseline 
Control 9.37% 12.40% 9.56% 8.67% 
Treatment 11.65% 13.96% 11.43% 7.95% 
T-test (p value) 0.136 0.636 0.582 0.636 
1nd wave 
Control 10.16% 12.66% 9.05% 7.61% 
Treatment 9.97% 11.28% 8.18% 6.51% 
T-test (p value) 0.024 0.645 0.067 0.045 
2nd wave 
Control 9.61% 10.11% 7.32% 3.92% 
Treatment 10.00% 10.60% 7.08% 3.33% 
T-test (p value) 0.223 0.574 0.293 0.569 
Notes:  T-test of difference in household means computed clustering at the municipality level. 
 
In order to capture the covariate nature of weather shocks, we use the proportion of 
households within a municipality reporting to have suffered this shock (de Janvry et al., 
2006). Community violence is obtained from other sources and measures the number of 
terrorist attacks that municipalities had during the year before the interview.8 Mean 
statistics and differences among treatment and control municipalities are presented in 
Table 2 As we can observe, there are not pre-treatment and post-treatment statistical 
differences in the occurrence of these covariate shocks between treatment and control 
municipalities.  
Table 2. Frequency of Covariate Shocks 
 Survey Treatment Control T-test (p value) 
Weather Baseline 0.82 0.80 0.9725 
 1st wave 0.96 1.06 0.8631 
 2nd wave 1.35 1.74 0.1639 
Violence Baseline 0.82 0.87 0.8744 
 1st wave 0.75 1.25 0.2075 
 2nd wave 0.89 1.61 0.3476 
Notes: Numbers indicates the average proportion of households on each municipality that have suffered 
weather and violence shocks. T-test of difference in means among communities in the sample. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 These data have been collected by Interconexion Electrica SA (ISA) since 1998. ISA is the biggest power line 
operator in Colombia, which has been the target of recurrent terrorist attacks.  
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Consumption 
The evaluation survey of FA contains detailed information on food and nonfood 
expenditures in all three rounds: baseline, first wave, and second wave. In food 
expenditures, there is information on the amount of money spent by households in buying 
fruits and vegetables, cereals and grains, meats and animal products, and other food 
products, like soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, coffee, tea, etc. In the nonfood expenditures 
category, there is information on the money spent on clothing, health products and 
services, house maintenance products, school and educational goods, transportation, 
utilities, and other nonfood expenditures, like cigarettes, social events, and toys. 
Expenditures on durables, such as furniture, and luxury items are excluded from the 
calculation of nonfood expenditures. 
Depending on the commodity, good, or service, the survey asked the head of 
household about the expenditures made during the week, month, semester, or year prior to 
the date of the survey. In order to construct the measures of household consumption used 
in this paper, we converted all expenditures into a household’s monthly expenditures and 
then added them up across the corresponding categories: total consumption, food 
consumption, and nonfood consumption. We also deflated the measures using the National 
Consumer Price Index of Colombia and turned them into adult-equivalent9 pesos at 
constant 2002 prices. Self-consumption was not included in the consumption measures due 
to lack of detailed information.  
Table 3 shows that households spend around COP$62,500 per adult equivalent per 
month on total consumption, and that 70% of these expenditures are on food. There are no 
                                                          
9 Household members older than 12 years old are counted as 1 person; household members younger than 12 
years are counted as 0.5 person.  
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pretreatment differences in consumption between treatment and control households. 
Attanasio et al. (2005) have shown the effectiveness of the FA program to increase food 
consumption in both rural and urban areas. They estimate a 15% increase in average 
consumption levels one year after the baseline survey. They also find that shares in food 
and nonfood consumption are not affected by the program but that it has created 
redistributive effects in favor of children through expenditure on children’s clothing and on 
education. The program has not significantly affected consumption of adult goods, such as 
alcohol and tobacco or adults’ clothing. 
Table 3. Consumption at Baseline 
 Total Food Nonfood 
Treatment 62565.66     41875.94     20689.72     
Control 61197 42568.1     19651.37 
T-test 0.2493           0.3863           0.1906           
Notes: Consumption measures are per adult equivalent deflated to 2002 price level in Colombian pesos. T-test 
of difference in means computed clustering at the municipality level. 
 
Control Variables 
Table 4 provides the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in 
the analysis for the sample of households in the treatment and control municipalities for all 
three surveys. All of the variables used in all of the regressions are at the household level. 
Monthly household income is constructed by adding reported labor income, self-
employment, pensions, interest, rents, and government transfers, including FA potential 
transfer.10 Income transfers and remittances received from neighbors, friends, and 
relatives are excluded from total income, as these sources of income are likely to reflect ex-
post adjustments to shocks. Income is expressed in adult equivalent measures and deflated 
to 2002 prices. Agriculture indicates the household head was occupied in agricultural 
                                                          
10 Potential FA transfer was estimated for all beneficiary households according the number of beneficiary 
children in the household.   
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activities. Members economically active indicates the number of persons in the household 
older than 12 who were working or looking for job at the moment of the survey. Education 
variables indicates the last level of education by the head and partner of the household.11 
Urban is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for households located in urban areas 
and zero, otherwise. Household composition variables represents the proportion of 
household members by age.  
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Main Variables for all Survey Rounds 
 Treatment Control 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Income 59742 47636 53954 57921 
Labor Income 28390 41619 29128 50064 
HH head age 45.182 12.540 46.727 12.676 
Wife age 39.889 9.959 40.997 10.177 
HH head education 2.885 1.430 2.974 1.495 
Spouse education 3.083 1.198 3.159 1.290 
Female HH heada 0.216 0.412 0.182 0.386 
Own housea 0.271 0.444 0.245 0.430 
Urbana 0.461 0.499 0.547 0.498 
Agriculturea 0.107 0.161 0.096 0.150 
Number of HH members 0–6 0.875 1.003 0.695 0.927 
Number of HH members 7–12 1.391 1.026 1.428 1.005 
Number of HH members 13–17 1.293 0.898 1.238 0.905 
Number of HH members 4.669 1.784 4.789 1.784 
Members economically active 1.885 1.187 2.024 1.223 
Notes: Averages based on three rounds. Income measures are per adult equivalent deflated to 2002 price 
level in Colombian pesos.a Mean values of dummy variables represent percentage of households that meet 
each of the conditions of the variables.  
 
4. Full Risk Sharing and the Permanent Income Hypothesis 
The most relevant risk coping strategies theorized in the literature are the full risk-
sharing hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). The full risk-sharing 
hypothesis implies that, once aggregate shocks are accounted for, the growth rate of 
consumption would be independent of any idiosyncratic shock affecting the income 
available to the household (Bardhan & Udry, 1999). That is, the only risk that any 
                                                          
11 Education categories are: 1, none; 2, incomplete elementary; 3, complete elementary; 4, incomplete 
secondary; 5, complete secondary; 6, college; 7, graduate. 
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household faces is the risk faced by the municipality as a whole. The alternative mechanism 
to coping with income shocks is the permanent income hypothesis, which states that a 
household with no opportunity for cross-sectional risk pooling, but with unlimited access 
to a credit market and separable preferences of consumption and labor, makes savings or 
lending decisions so that the effects of shocks are spread out between current and future 
consumption (Bardham & Udry, 1999). According to the hypothesis, individuals tend to 
smooth consumption when facing transitory income fluctuations. In practice, these 
hypotheses are not very relevant to most of the rural households in developing countries, 
given the inexistence of complete credit markets.  
Although both hypotheses have been repeatedly rejected in studies using micro-
data, empirical evidence has shown that consumption reacts too little to income shocks to 
be consistent with the theory. Townsend (1994) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) test 
the hypothesis in the ICRISAT Indian villages and reject it, although they find a substantial 
amount of risk sharing. Deaton (1992) and Grimard (1997) test the hypothesis of perfect 
risk sharing within villages and ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire and find little evidence of any 
risk pooling at the municipality level and somewhat stronger evidence within ethnic 
groups. Udry (1994) also rejects the hypothesis for northern Nigerian villages. Skoufias 
(2003) examined the extent to which Russian households were able to protect their 
consumption from fluctuations in their income using longitudinal data from 1994 to 2000. 
The study found that consumption was only partially protected from idiosyncratic shocks 
to income, with food consumption’s being better protected than nonfood consumption 
expenditures. 
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Evidence from developed countries has also rejected the hypothesis of full risk 
insurance (Mace, 1991; Cochrane, 1991). Cochrane (1991), using data on household food 
consumption from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1980–1983, 
regressed changes in consumption onto different measures of idiosyncratic shocks. His 
results rejected the full insurance hypothesis for some but not all of the different shocks. 
Similarly, Mace (1991) tested consumption insurance with panel data from the U.S. 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). She could not reject the full insurance hypothesis 
when evaluating changes in consumption against changes in income, but she did reject full 
insurance when using growth rates. Finally, using household panel data from Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico, and Russia, Skoufias and Quisumbing (2003) examined the extent to 
which households are able through formal and/or informal arrangements to insure their 
consumption from specific economic shocks and fluctuations in their real income. The 
study showed that adjustments in nonfood consumption appeared to act as a mechanism 
for partially insuring ex-post the consumption of food from the effects of income changes.  
These findings raise the question of how households achieve some level of 
consumption smoothing given their limited access to financial markets. It seems that poor 
households engage in self-insurance strategies and mechanisms to secure their level of 
consumption once they face negative shocks. The most common self-insurance 
mechanisms for uninsured households are taking loans from the informal financial sector 
(Udry, 1994), selling assets (Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993), increasing 
household labor supply (Kochar, 1998), or sending children to work in order to 
supplement income (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997). Townsend (1994) showed that even 
extremely poor villages in rural India may have self-insurance strategies that allow them to 
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come close to an optimal allocation of risk bearing. While these actions enable households 
to spread the effects of income shocks over time, they might have adverse consequences in 
the long run in terms of poverty and future vulnerability of households.12  
According to Baez (2006), the work to date on the extent of consumption smoothing 
in rural areas allows us to draw three important conclusions. First, most if not all of the 
empirical work has mainly rejected the full risk-sharing model. Second, and regardless of 
that rejection, a large amount of consumption smoothing is taking place. Rural households 
are not purely consuming what they earn, although the poorest have less scope to do so. 
And third, considering some market failures that obstruct formal insurance in rural 
villages, informal mechanisms seem to play a significant role in protecting their 
consumption.  
As these conclusions have been widely accepted, recent literature has gone beyond 
the complete market model and has proposed and encouraged “the construction and 
testing of market models with partial insurance” (cited in Blundell et al., 2008; Deaton & 
Paxson, 1992). Also, literature has centered on alternative informal instruments to bear 
risk, estimating the extent of consumption insurance over and above self-insurance, 
including the role of public interventions. In this paper we address both issues. First, we 
investigate how well-known public interventions in developing countries—CCTs—can play 
a significant role in reducing consumption vulnerability of poor households. Second, we 
estimate the degree of consumption insurance under the full risk-sharing model and under 
a partial insurance model recently proposed by Blundell et al. (2008). 
                                                          
12 For example, there is evidence that the use of children as part of the household labor pool compromises 
human capital and productivity of those children, raising the risk of poverty for the next generation. Also, if 
assets that are used to buffer consumption from income fluctuations are themselves used in the production 
process, then there can be important effects on future income from even temporary shocks to current income. 
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Public interventions can play a significant role in strengthening or displacing the 
informal insurance mechanisms already in place. The following examples illustrate some of 
the effects of public intervention on consumption insurance. In South Africa, Jensen (2002) 
compares the difference in the level of remittances received by pensioned and non-
pensioned workers, after the increase in pension levels, relative to the difference before the 
increase. Findings based on the crowding-out effect differ across both groups. In Mexico, 
public cash transfer programs have not displaced informal mechanisms within the scheme 
of risk-sharing mechanisms (Skoufias, 2003); the evidence, however, is not clear for 
Northern Thai villages, where the effects of public intervention vary across distinct private 
transfers and informal mechanisms (Townsend, 1995). Finally, in the case of Mexico, 
García-Verdú (2002) analyzes a model of informal insurance and also finds that there is no 
crowding-out effect between cash transfers and informal safety nets. 
To date, no structural model has been estimated to address the issue of partial 
insurance directly. Blundell et al. (2008) address the issue of whether partial consumption 
insurance is available to agents and estimate the degree of insurance over and above self-
insurance through savings. They do so by contrasting shifts in the distribution of income 
growth with shifts in the distribution of consumption growth and then analyze how these 
two measures correlate over time. We follow this methodology to estimate the parameters 
of partial insurance for transitory and permanent shocks. Section 6 presents the model 
proposed by Blundell et al. (2008), which is used in this paper for the estimation of partial 
insurance parameters.  
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5. Empirical Evidence of Consumption Insurance under the Full Risk-sharing Model 
In this section we consider the model of Pareto efficient risk pooling within a 
community to estimate the extent of risk sharing in poor households in Colombia and to 
test the effect of FA as an instrument for consumption smoothing. One way of testing the 
hypothesis of complete risk sharing within a community is to examine whether the growth 
rate of household consumption is independent of the growth rate in household income 
after controlling for aggregate shocks.  
We employ the following reduced form specification commonly encountered in the 
literature (e.g., Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Townsend, 1994; Ravallion & Chaudhuri, 
1997) to test the null hypothesis of complete risk sharing within a municipality:13 
    	  
              (1) 
where  refers to adult equivalent consumption per capita of household i in municipality 
v at time t; represents idiosyncratic shocks; is a set of socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of the household that takes into account the composition of 
the household by age, sex, and education level of household head; and 
T U V WXrepresent household, municipality, time, municipality-time fixed-effects, 
and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively.  
Theory predicts that, under complete risk sharing,   , and provides an estimate 
of the extent to which idiosyncratic income shocks play a significant role in explaining the 
household-specific consumption changes. For the purposes of the empirical analysis, the 
                                                          
13 Similar specifications are defined in terms of consumption and income growth and include a set of binary 
variables D identifying each community separately by survey round (round and community interaction 
terms) in order to control for covariate shocks.   
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insurance group is defined to be the full set of households within a municipality.14 Since our 
sample is representative of poor households in small towns in Colombia, and credit and 
insurance markets don’t function at all in these towns,15 the identification of the insurance 
group is adequate. In addition, we should expect that insurance arrangements are easier to 
organize and enforce in small and poor communities.  
 
Consumption Insurance of FA 
To test the effect of FA on consumption smoothing of beneficiary households, 
equation (1) is modified by including the FAht, which is a binary variable equal to 1 for 
households in treatment municipalities and 0 for households in control municipalities for 
each year. In this equation, the coefficient  is the difference in the vulnerability to risk 
between beneficiary and control households in the program. A negative estimate of Y 
implies that FA has decreased vulnerability to risk in the treatment communities. An 
insignificant estimate of Ysuggests that there are no significant differences in the level of 
consumption insurance between control and treatment households. The coefficient 
reflects the effect of the program on consumption. 
    	   !" # 	   !"  
          $%& 
 We consider different definitions of consumption and different types of 
idiosyncratic shocks to estimate fixed effects regressions. As dependent variables we use 
food consumption, nonfood consumption, and total consumption. The idiosyncratic shocks 
considered are: (i) death of a household member, (ii) illness of a household member, (iii) 
                                                          
14 On average, there are 50 households in each municipality. 
15 Less than 5% of the households have credit or a savings account. 
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crop loss or job loss, (iv) unemployment of household head, (v) weather shock, and (vi) 
violence. The household surveys asked each household whether it has suffered any of these 
shocks during the year prior to the date of the interview. Hence, each household was 
allowed to declare whether it was affected by a shock or not.  
Fixed effects estimates of equation (2) presented in Table 5 include only one type of 
shock at a time in the regression. As discussed above, these estimates are obtained under 
the assumption that an insurance group consists of all households in a municipality and 
include municipality-year fixed effects. All regressions control for household composition 
by age, sex, and the following household characteristics: age and dummies for level of 
education of the household head, female household head, number of household members 
active in the labor market, dummy if the house is owned as a measure of assets, dummy for 
households working in agriculture as a proxy of vulnerability to shocks, and dummy for 
households located in urban regions as well as in different economics regions in the 
country.  
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Table 5. Impact of Idiosyncratic Shocks on Consumption 
 Food consumption  Nonfood consumption Total consumption 
Crop loss -0.078*** -0.031 -0.065** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
*Treatment 0.058*  0.173* 0.086* 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
Unemployment -0.257*** -0.285*** -0.286*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
*Treatment 0.077 0.005 0.063 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) 
Death  0.000 0.296*** 0.144** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
*Treatment -0.186* -0.232** -0.198** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Weather 0.011 0.106 0.035 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
*Treatment -0.170* 0.018 -0.040 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Violence 0.034 0.255*** 0.163*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
*Treatment 0.066 -0.344** -0.158* 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) 
Illness 0.026 0.187*** 0.146*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
*Treatment -0.017 -0.008 0.013 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
Illness, HH head -0.010 -0.117** 0.028 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
*Treatment -0.001 0.099 0.015 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
Illness, non–wage earners 0.035 0.159*** 0.059* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
*Treatment 0.000 0.059 0.035 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
Illness, children -0.036    0.197*** 0.047    
 (0.02)    (0.04)    (0.03)    
*Treatment 0.095*   0.061    0.067    
 (0.04)    (0.07)    (0.05)    
Any shock -0.046**  0.135*** -0.145*** 
 (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
*Treatment 0.031*   0.121**  0.078** 
 (0.01)    (0.04)    (0.03) 
Notes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not 
reported. Municipality -year effects included. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the 
*10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
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Considering shocks one at a time, it is evident that the null hypothesis of perfect risk 
sharing is rejected for crop loss and unemployment when food consumption is the right 
hand side variable. Crop loss will reduce per capita food consumption by 8% and total 
consumption by 6%, while unemployment will reduce food consumption by 25% and 
nonfood consumption by 28%.16 Weather shocks have no effect on consumption.  
Shocks from death or illness of a household member increase nonfood and total 
consumption, as does being victim of violence, so there is no evidence of consumption 
smoothing for these shocks. On the contrary, consumption increases with respect to 
households that have no shocks. The increase in nonfood consumption is explained by the 
fact that these shocks usually increase health expenditures17 or other components of 
nonfood expenditures. Neither of these shocks affects food consumption. 
A positive estimate of the illness shock can be explained if the sick member is not an 
income provider for the household. That is, if health shocks hit household members that 
contribute income to the household, we should expect a decline in consumption due to the 
loss of labor income and to an increase in health expenditures, so the final effect in 
consumption will be ambiguous. But if illness shocks hit an income dependent of the 
household, consumption will definitely increase. Therefore, we identified which members 
of the household had illness shocks. We found that health shocks of the household head 
decrease nonfood consumption, while health shocks of household members not in the labor 
market increase nonfood consumption. Therefore, the effect of health shocks in 
                                                          
16 The high coefficients of job loss could be a consequence of the potential endogeneity of this variable in the 
consumption equation. It could be expected that unemployment is correlated with unobservable 
characteristics of the household to explain consumption.  
17 Nonfood consumption is the sum of health, clothing, and miscellaneous expenditures.  
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consumption in our sample is a function of the role in the labor market of the household 
member who is receiving the illness shock. 
The role of FA as an instrument for consumption insurance is also evaluated. Being a 
beneficiary of the FA program would protect the household’s food consumption when it 
experiences a crop loss but not unemployment of the household head. It is interesting to 
see that treatment households are no better insured against unemployment than control 
households as the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero.  
Negative estimations of violence and death shocks for treatment households 
indicate that, while control households increase consumption after these shocks, treatment 
households are better able to buffer them. One explanation is that treatment households 
might have available less costly ex-ante self-insurance strategies than control households. 
For example, it is possible that the FA cash transfer works as an income-smoothing 
mechanism for treatment households. A second explanation is that treatment households 
could be less exposed to health and violence shocks.  
In the previous section we showed that shocks were not correlated with treatment 
before the program was implemented. However, we could expect that treatment 
households are less exposed to health shocks, including illness and death, since the 
preventive care component of the program may have an impact on reducing the illness risk 
of both adults and children. We tested the second hypothesis (refer to Table 1 for results) 
and found that illness shocks have decreased during the first and second waves, with 
respect to the baseline, and that there is no statistical difference between treatment and 
control groups, except for illness of a non–wage earner, which is lower for treatment 
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households than control households during the first survey. That difference disappears 
during the second survey. Therefore, the second hypothesis is not very probable.  
We also tested the first hypothesis. Results are presented in Table 11 in the next 
section. We find that there are no statically significant differences between ex-post risk 
coping strategies used by treatment and control households, with the exception of relative 
and friend transfers. So it should be the case that treatment households are better able than 
control households to use income-smoothing strategies or ex-ante consumption-smoothing 
strategies.  
Finally, we observe that, in general, having a negative shock will reduce food 
consumption but increase nonfood consumption and that the FA program works as an 
insurance to smooth food consumption but not to reduce increased nonfood expenditures. 
Total consumption has a very similar behavior as food consumption, which is explained by 
the fact that the share of food consumption is approximately 70% of total consumption.  
 
Covariate Shocks 
In order to capture the covariate nature of weather and violence shocks, we use the 
proportion of households within a municipality reporting to have suffered each shock as 
environmental and violence shock variables. Also, we use an alternative measure for 
violence: the number of terrorist attacks that municipalities have had during the year 
before the interview.  
To examine the degree of consumption smoothing of individual households with 
respect to covariate risk, we remove the municipality-year fixed effects from the estimation 
to calculate the following equation: 
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The model of full risk sharing predicts that local risk-sharing arrangements permit 
households to efficiently pool the idiosyncratic variation within communities, but they can 
do little to help households deal with covariate risk. On the other hand, the PIH predicts 
that perfect credit markets permit households to smooth consumption, even when they are 
under covariate risk, if and only if these shocks are transitory. Therefore, we should expect 

'  ( under a Pareto efficient model, or an estimate of  ) 
' ) if households are able 
to smooth at least some part of community shocks by formal or informal insurance 
mechanisms.  
As before, we consider the following dependent variables: food consumption, 
nonfood consumption, and total consumption. The covariate shocks considered are: (i) 
violence and (ii) weather shocks. For estimation, we use fixed effects regression with 
robust standard errors clustering at a municipality level. All regressions control for the 
same exogenous variables included in equation (2). Results are presented in Table 6. As we 
observe, violence does not affect consumption. This is reasonable if we assume that most of 
the terrorist attacks are targeted at institutions such as banks, police stations, government 
offices, or to the army and not to civilians. Weather shocks seem to have a very small effect 
on consumption, decreasing nonfood consumption by 1% in control communities and by 
only 0.1% in treatment communities. Results are opposite to economic predictions, under 
which we should expect a significant effect from covariate shocks on consumption, with 
estimations close to one. However, these results can be explained by the fact that they are 
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not permanent but transitory shocks. In fact, Colombia had no severe long-term weather 
shocks during 2002–2005.  
Table 6. Impact of Covariate Shocks on Consumption 
 Food consumption Nonfood consumption Total consumption 
Violence -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
*Treatment 0.009 0.005 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Weather shocks 0.001    -0.013*** -0.006*** 
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
*Treatment 0.005*   0.009*   0.007**  
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
Notes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value, in units of 2002 pesos. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not 
reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
 
Consumption Smoothing Against Idiosyncratic Income Change 
Most of the empirical studies (Skoufias, 2003; Townsend, 1994; Ravallion & 
Chaudhuri, 1997) have tested the hypothesis of full risk sharing using changes on 
household income as a measure of shocks. Using income growth instead of negative shocks 
dummy variables has the advantage that income has the same time frame as consumption. 
In the section above, the reference period of consumption (the month before the survey) is 
very different from the period of shocks (year prior to the survey).  
We estimate equation (3) using fixed effects of regression. In this specification we 
use consumption growth per adult equivalent in constant values as a dependent variable 
and income growth per adult equivalent in constant values as independent variables. Since 
declared income might be endogenous in our specifications, we use income moments as 
instrumental variables to control for endogeneity. Municipality-time fixed effects are 
replaced by a set of binary variables D identifying each community separately by survey 
round (round and community interaction terms). Including the community/round 
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interaction dummies have the purpose of controlling for aggregate shocks insured at the 
community level.  
*    *+   ! # *+  
  , -     (3) 
Results from this specification will reveal the average degree of consumption 
insurance in the community to any change in the household’s income. As before, under full 
risk sharing we expect .  but if . is positive and significant, it provides an estimate of 
the partial correlation between income and consumption growth in control municipalities. 
If FA helps beneficiary households to cope with income shocks, we should expect a 
significantly negative estimate of ., and the sum .  . will provide an estimate of the 
partial correlation between income and consumption growth in the treatment 
municipalities. The measure of consumption insurance adopted under this specification 
can be interpreted as a partial insurance parameter, where lower estimated values of . 
suggest a high degree of consumption insurance and thus a lower vulnerability of 
consumption to income shocks (Amin et al., 2003). 
Table 7 reports estimations of equation (3) for total consumption and for food and 
nonfood consumption separately. The estimates presented in column (1) show that a 10% 
drop in real income is accompanied by a 1.8% drop in household total consumption, a 
slightly lower (1.7%) decrease in food consumption, and a higher (2%) drop in nonfood 
consumption. The relatively higher income coefficients for nonfood than for food 
consumption suggest that the consumption of food may be better insured than the 
consumption of nonfood.  
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The same regression was estimated using percentage change in labor income as an 
explanatory variable. We should expect a higher degree of consumption insurance with 
respect to changes in labor income than with respect to changes in total income since labor 
income is already insured.18 In fact, we observe in Table 7 that consumption insurance is 
higher for labor income than for total income. The estimates for food consumption indicate 
that a 10% decrease in labor income will reduce total consumption by 0.9%, with no 
differences between food and nonfood consumption.  
Therefore, if households perceive CCT as permanent income, we should expect a 
higher degree of consumption insurance for beneficiary households. However, the 
insignificant coefficients of the interaction of income changes with the dummy variable 
identifying beneficiary households of FA suggest that there are no significant differences in 
the level of consumption insurance between control and treatment households. One 
possible explanation is that households don’t perceive the program as permanent income, 
although we consider that this is not very probable since the Colombian government has 
not defined a time frame for the program’s operation. Another explanation is that there 
could be pre-treatment differences in the level of insurance among treatment and control 
households.19 As this reason is more likely, we address it using matching methods. 
Description of the methodology and results are presented in a later section.  
  
                                                          
18 Labor contracts are income-smoothing mechanisms that might reduce risk and the effects of negative 
income shocks.  
19 Particularly if consumption was less insured in the treatment municipalities relative to control 
municipalities prior to the implementation of the FA program. 
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Table 7. Impact of Idiosyncratic Income Changes in Household Consumption 
 Food consumption  Nonfood consumption Total consumption 
 b/se b/se b/se    
Δ(Ln total income) 0.172*** 0.201*** 0.188*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    
*Treatment -0.016 -0.042 -0.027    
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)    
Δ(Ln labor income) 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)    
*Treatment -0.016 0.019 0.000    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Notes: The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not 
reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
 
Risk Pooling at the Community Level 
Finally, we investigate whether risk sharing is in fact taking place among households 
within the same insurance community by eliminating the municipality-year fixed effects 
from equation (3) and including the average income growth of each municipality as a right 
hand side variable, as suggested by Deaton (1997) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997).  
*    *+   !*+  *+////  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Under this model, the growth rate in household consumption is determined by the 
growth rate in household income as well as the growth rate in average community income. 
According to the hypothesis of full risk sharing,   (so individual consumption is not 
protected from aggregate income shocks. Under imperfect risk sharing, evidence that the 
growth rate in average community income has a significant role in the growth rate of 
household consumption is consistent with the hypothesis that some risk sharing is taking 
place within the communities. We test also if the degree of insurance provided by the 
community is affected by the presence of the FA program. A positive coefficient would be 
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interpreted as the program’s increasing risk pooling in the community; the opposite would 
be concluded for a negative coefficient.  
Table 8. Impact of Average Community Income Changes in Household Consumption 
 Food consumption Nonfood consumption Total consumption  
 b/se b/se b/se 
Δ(Average Ln income, 
municipality) 
0.630* 0.386 0.353 
 (0.27) (0.59) (0.36) 
*Treatment -0.608 -0.929 -0.254 
 (0.69) (1.12) (0.76) 
Δ(Average Ln labor 
income, municipality) 
-0.004 -0.878 -0.381 
 (0.47) (0.65) (0.48) 
*Treatment 0.380 -0.202 0.448 
 (0.88) (1.44) (0.89) 
Notes:  The measure of consumption and income is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but 
not reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level. 
  
The estimated coefficients of the growth rate in average community income, the 
parameters 010, are reported in Table 8. The estimates provide evidence in favor of 
community risk sharing in food consumption but not in nonfood or total consumption. Also, 
no significant differences are found regarding the effect of mean community growth rate 
between treatment and control households. As changes in average community income 
reflect covariate income shocks, results show that households are less insured to covariate 
income shocks than to idiosyncratic income shocks, 37% and 80%, respectively.  
Nonetheless, these results are opposed to our findings above when using measures 
of weather and violence shocks. As we said before, it is possible that our measures of 
community shocks are not the best or that they reflect community transitory shocks 
instead of permanent shocks. In order to check our results, we estimate the partial 
insurance model proposed by Blundell et al. (2006) and calculate the partial insurance 
parameters for permanent and transitory shocks using the same data. Results are very 
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similar to our regressions above. Details of the methodology and results are presented in 
Section 6.  
Impact of FA on Consumption Insurance Using Matching Methods 
In order to correct any pretreatment differences remaining from the quasi-
experimental design used to select the sample of treatment and control municipalities, we 
use a difference in difference matching estimator20 (also called conditional matching) as a 
method of preprocessing our data. Matching involves pairing treatment and comparison 
units that are similar in terms of their observable characteristics, and a DID estimator 
compares the conditional before/after outcomes of participants with those of 
nonparticipants, allowing for unobservable but temporally invariant differences in 
outcomes between participants and nonparticipants. Thus, the DID matching estimator 
extends the conventional DID estimator by defining outcomes conditional on the 
propensity score and using nonparametric matching methods to construct the differences. 
DID matching is superior to DID as it does not impose linear functional form restrictions in 
estimating the conditional expectation of the outcome variable and does reweight the 
observations according to the weighting function of the matching estimator (Smith & Todd, 
2005).  
In this section, we find unbiased estimates of the effects of the program in 
consumption insurance as a result of household income shocks and community average 
income shocks. We first preprocess our dataset with matching non-parametric methods21 
and then apply parametric techniques to increase efficiency. This procedure makes 
                                                          
20 DID matching was first suggested by Heckman et al. (1998a). It extends the conventional DID estimator by 
defining outcomes conditional on the propensity score and using semiparametric methods to construct the 
differences. 
21 For matching, we use non-parametric kernel propensity score matching. 
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parametric models produce more accurate and considerably less model-dependent causal 
inferences (Ho et al., 2007). Also, we restrict the analysis to individuals in the common 
support—i.e., the region over which treated individuals have a counterpart in the group of 
controls—in order to minimize any bias due to extrapolation within the parametric 
specification. 
Results in Table 9 show that, controlling for pretreatment differences, FA partially 
insures food consumption but not nonfood consumption. Unbiased estimates of the impact 
of the program on consumption insurance improve our previous estimates and are robust 
with estimations using dummy variables for idiosyncratic shocks.  
Table 9. DID Matching Estimations: Impact of Household and Average Community Income 
Changes in Household Consumption Controlling for Pretreatment Effects 
 Food consumption Nonfood consumption Total consumption 
 b/se b/se b/se    
Δ(Ln total income) 0.221*** 0.257*** 0.234*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)    
*Treatment -0.139*** -0.008 -0.154  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)    
Δ(Average Ln income, 
municipality) 
0.560** 0.386 0.353    
 (0.27) (0.59) (0.36)    
*Treatment 0.039 -0.008 0.015    
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)    
Notes:  The measure of consumption and income is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but 
not reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
 
Using DID matching gave us an advantage over the small number of studies that 
have tried to identify the impact of cash transfer programs on consumption insurance. As 
Skoufias (2003) remarks, “the absence of any reliable consumption data in treatment and 
control villages before the implementation of Progresa prevent one from applying the 
difference-in-differences estimator for the evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on 
consumption insurance” (pp.638).  
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6. Partial Insurance Model 
Based on Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), we estimate the degree of partial 
insurance for transitory and permanent shocks for different households’ characteristics: (i) 
household head education level, (ii) urban and rural households, (iii) single parent and 
biparental households, and (iv) FA beneficiary and control households. In this model, 
partial insurance is defined as smoothing mechanisms—other than personal savings and 
borrowings—to smooth consumption changes when incomes are shifted by permanent or 
transitory shocks. These mechanisms could help us understand the lower volatility of 
consumption in relation to the volatility of income and introduce a method to measure the 
impact of different-smoothing tools (Casado, 2009). This model is better than the full 
insurance model in the sense that it examines the roles of asymmetric information, moral 
hazard, and heterogeneity and shows how the complete markets model must be amended 
to include some forms of imperfect insurance.  
This analysis of partial insurance requires the study of income and consumption 
process and its relationship to transitory and permanent income shocks. In this model, the 
relationship between income shocks and consumption depends on the degree of 
persistence of income, and we expect to uncover less insurance for more persistent shocks. 
Blundell and Preston (1998) derive the conditions under which the growth of variance and 
covariance of income and consumption can be used to separately identify the growth in 
variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 
(2008) describe the transmission of income inequality into consumption inequality and 
derive the transitory and permanent partial insurance parameters.  
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It is supposed that income has the following equation: 
234 +  5
6 7  8  9 
where Y is real income and Z a set of control variables (such as education of the household 
head and number of household members, among others). 8 is the permanent income 
component, and 9 stands for transitory income.  
Assuming a random walk for 8 (8  8:  ;) and a martingale process MA(q) 
for 9 (9  , <=:=
>
=? ), the difference of the unpredicted income can be written as: 
*@  ;  A9where * @  *BC+ D *5
6 7 
The Euler equation with CRRA preferences and complete credit markets is: 
:
E: 
(  F:
(  
G*HIJ
K LJM:
E: 
Computing the mapping from the income shocksN and O to the optimal 
consumption growth following estimations by Blundell et al. (2008), and assuming that 
personal saving is the only mechanism available to smooth consumption, we obtain the 
consumption growth equation: 
AP  Q;  R  S 
where T is the loading factor of permanent shocks and U of transitory shocks and where V 
represents innovations in consumption independent of those from income. The moments 
required to compute the partial insurance parameters were estimated using diagonally 
weighted minimum distance (DWMD).  
Following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, cited in Blundell et al., 2008) we identify the 
parameters of interestUT for transitory and permanent shocks in income. Following 
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this approach, U and T can be understood as the instrumental variable estimation of *W on 
*1 using $*1:  *1  *1X& and Y$*W*1X&as instruments, respectively. 
U 
Y$*W*1X&
Y$*1*1X&
T 
Y$*W$*1:  *1  *1X&
Y$*1$*1:  *1  *1X&
 
Where transitory insurance parameter U is computed measuring the relation between 
income and lagged consumption, it must be correlated through the transitory component 
Y$*W*1X&  Z[. Similarly, we compute the covariance between current consumption and 
current income growth Y$*W*1&, removing the contribution of the transitory component 
to compute the permanent income shock effect Y$*W$*1:  *1  *1X&  Z\
 . Finally, 
the variance of the component Z]
  is computed like the variance of consumption growth, 
removing the contribution of permanent and transitory income shocks. 
In order to instrument our income variable, we use retrospective data on income 
captured in the baseline survey for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. We also infer income 
for 2004 from an income equation controlling for household and individual characteristics.  
In the above representation, the case of full insurance would be T  U  , where 
neither transitory nor permanent shocks in income would affect consumption. The case of 
no insurance would be T  U  (. Parameter estimations between zero and one identify 
the degree of transmission of income shocks into consumption. If coefficients are closer to 
zero, the degree of insurance will be higher. These partial insurance parameters include 
self-insurance (precautionary saving) and other insurance devices, but we cannot identify 
each insurance component by itself.  
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7. Empirical Evidence of Consumption Insurance under a Partial Insurance Model 
In this section we compare results from the full risk-sharing model with estimations 
from the partial insurance model proposed by Blundell et al. (2008). Using panel data on 
income and consumption, we are able to estimate the degree of partial insurance for 
transitory and permanent shocks for different household characteristics: (i) household 
head education level, (ii) urban and rural households, (iii) single parent households, and 
(iv) FA beneficiary households. Results show the advantage of allowing partial insurance, 
since households in the sample seem to be less insured than predicted by the complete 
market hypothesis but more insured than predicted by the permanent income hypothesis.  
The FA dataset doesn’t show evidence of a MA(q) process for transitory shocks, so 
we assume they are uncorrelated (9  ). Diagonally weighted minimum distance 
(DWMD) was used to estimate parameters because it allows for heteroskedasticity, unlike 
equally weighted minimum distance (EWMD). Also, we assume that insurance parameters 
are constant over time.  
Table 10. Partial Insurance Parameters 
  Food consumption Nonfood consumption 
Criteria Groups Permanent 
shocks (Φ) 
Transitory 
shocks (Ψ) 
Permanent 
shocks (Φ) 
Transitory 
shocks (Ψ) 
Complete sample  0.42 0.18 0.50 0.17 
Program FA Control group 0.44 0.14 0.51 0.17 
Treatment group 0.37 0.16 0.51 0.16 
Education of 
household head  
without high school 0.42 0.17 0.49 0.17 
with high school 0.26 0.14 . 0.22 
Number of 
parents 
Two 0.41 0.17 0.52 0.18 
One  0.41 0.14 0.42 0.15 
Location Rural 0.43 0.15 . 0.21 
Urban 0.41 0.20 0.48 0.13 
Notes:  The measure of consumption and income is its adult equivalent value, in units of 2002 pesos.  
 
Estimations of transitory and permanent partial insurance parameters for different 
groups are presented in Table 10. Parameters are estimated for the whole sample and for 
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treatment and control households of the FA program. Other subgroups are also considered 
in order to identify households with better mechanisms for consumption smoothing. We 
estimated partial insurance parameters for education of the household head (with or 
without high school), number of parents in the household, and household location in urban 
or rural municipality.  
For the full sample, a 10% permanent income shock induces a 4.2% permanent 
change in food consumption and a 5% change in nonfood consumption. Simultaneously, a 
10% transitory income shock induces significant 1.8% transitory and permanent changes 
in consumption. We find higher degrees of insurance to transitory shocks than to 
permanent shocks for all different groups. Food consumption seems to insure better from 
permanent shocks than nonfood consumption. The insurance coefficient of the transitory 
shocks is not statistically different between food and nonfood consumption, which 
indicates that total consumption is not fully insured against transitory shocks but that the 
degree of insurance is high.  
The insurance against permanent shocks for the treatment group is higher than for 
the control group for food consumption but not for nonfood consumption. That is, as in our 
previous results, we observe that the program protects food consumption but not nonfood 
consumption of beneficiary households. More interesting are the results for educated 
household heads. The insurance capacity to permanent shocks of educated household 
heads (with high school) is almost 74%, while the insurance capacity of uneducated 
household heads (without high school) is 58%. Insurance to transitory shocks is also 
higher for educated households, but the difference with uneducated households is not 
statistically significant. Finally, we have computed the insurance for urban-rural, bi-
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parental, and single-parent households, not finding relevant differences in comparison with 
the whole sample. In conclusion, we observe that the partial insurance for permanent and 
transitory shocks provides a better understanding of the degree of insurance than the full 
insurance model.  
 
8. Risk Coping Strategies and the Role of FA 
Results have shown that households in rural Colombia are able to partially spread 
the effects of income shocks over time and that this is partially due to risk-sharing 
arrangements across households at the community level at any one point in time. However, 
we also observed that covariance between nonfood consumption and income is still pretty 
low and that risk pooling has been effective in smoothing only food consumption but not 
other consumption. Therefore, households may be adopting a variety of self-insurance 
strategies to spread the effects of income shocks over time. For example, they may use their 
savings (Paxson, 1992); take out loans from the informal financial sector (Udry, 1994); sell 
assets (Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993); adjust their labor supply (Kochar, 
1998) including sending their children to work instead of school in order to supplement 
income (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997); or rely on transfers and remittances from friends and 
neighbors (Rosenzweig, 1988; Besley, 1995; Morduch, 1999).  
In this section we examine whether the incidence of different shocks is associated 
with increased likelihood of using the following coping instruments: (i) increasing 
expenditures, (ii) using savings, (iii) incurring debts, (iv) receiving transfers from friends 
or relatives (v), selling assets, or (vi) increasing the labor supply of household members. 
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Households were asked at baseline and in the first survey how they responded to these 
shocks. Households could select more than one instrument.  
Although answers to these questions could differ from their behavioral responses, 
they give a glimpse of how households cope with income shocks and how FA alters these 
responses. We estimate the following probit model separately for each of the six coping 
instruments mentioned above: 
8F^_$+  (&    
	   !$  
	&  `  (4) 
where Y equals one when the household declares it used each specific instrument to cope 
with shocks and where S is a vector of dummy variables denoting the incidence of any of 
the following shocks: (i) death of a household member, (ii) illness of a household member, 
(iii) crop loss, (iv) natural disaster, or (v) violence.  X is a vector of household and 
municipality characteristics, such as the age and sex of household head and spouse, 
whether the household is headed by a female, the education level of the household head 
and spouse, binary variables for owning the house where they live, if the household works 
on cropping or harvesting, and age composition of the household. Municipality variables 
include a dummy variable for household beneficiaries of FA, for the regions of the country, 
for urban areas, and for the survey round. Finally, the coefficients of interest are β and β1, 
where β denotes whether the incidence of a shock increases the likelihood that the 
dependent variable Y equals 1 and the extent to which the incidence of the same shock 
entails a stronger or opposing reaction in the households benefited by FA (β + β1). 
Table 11 presents the marginal effects of the different shock variables on the 
probability of adopting a specific response. Results show that, controlling for household 
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characteristics and for any income shocks, beneficiary households seem to rely more on 
savings and less on transfers to smooth consumption. Crop loss is handled by reducing 
expenditures and receiving transfers from friends and relatives. However, it is notable that 
treatment households seem to reduce the likelihood of using transfers from friends and 
relatives as a risk coping instrument when they are hit by these shocks and increase the 
likelihood of using assets as a risk coping instrument.  
Weather and death shocks are more likely to result in a household’s receiving help 
from relatives, while illness shocks force households to incur new loans, probably in the 
informal sector at very high interest rates. However, the program has no differential effect 
on these self-insurance arrangements.  
Table 11. Risk Coping Strategies for Idiosyncratic Shocks 
 Reduce 
expenditures 
Use 
savings 
Sell assets Internal 
transfers 
Credit Increase 
labor supply 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Treatment -0.194 0.131* -0.055 -0.250** -0.030 -0.010    
 (0.11) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)    
Death -0.150 0.235* 0.107 0.231* 0.026 -0.328*   
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)    
Death *trtmt 0.000 -0.043 -0.192 0.166 0.115 0.348    
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.21)    
Illness -0.043 0.138 -0.012 0.128 0.304*** -0.126    
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)    
Ilness *trtmt 0.043 0.005 -0.059 0.150 0.004 0.083    
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)    
Crop loss 0.429*** -0.060 -0.138* 0.265*** 0.009 0.100    
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)    
Crop loss *trtmt -0.018 0.084 0.144* -0.189* 0.045 0.091    
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)    
Weather -0.055 0.046 -0.085 0.365* -0.124 0.125    
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)    
Weather *trtmt -0.051 -0.709* 0.105 -0.133 -0.325 -0.239    
 (0.23) (0.30) (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)    
Violence -0.252* -0.142 0.120 -0.056 -0.422* -0.011    
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14)    
Violence *trtmt 0.278 0.282 -0.113 0.048 0.110 -0.048    
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.27) (0.19) (0.22) (0.17)    
N 5528 5522 5518 5516 5525 5519 
Notes:  The measure of consumption is its adult equivalent value in units of 2002 pesos. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at the municipality level, are in parentheses. Additional repressors included but not 
reported. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.  
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Results from this section suggest that the FA program might be crowding out some 
self-insurance instruments such as internal transfers, while reinforcing the use of savings. 
Attanasio and Rios-Rull (1999) have shown that, in a model of risk sharing under limited 
commitment, the introduction of a government insurance scheme can crowd out 
preexisting informal risk-sharing arrangements, resulting in a decrease in welfare for the 
beneficiaries. Therefore, further research should explore how different coping instruments 
have in fact been displaced or reinforced by FA.  
Although results reveal that the program affects the role of transfers as a risk coping 
instrument for treatment households, we observe statistical differences neither over time 
nor between treatment and control samples on transfers to and from households, in kind, 
or in cash. Average transfers before and after the program are presented in Table 12. As 
stated above, evidence here is not validated with household behavior.  
Table 12. Transfers in Money Received by Households 
 Treatment Control T-test (p-value) 
Baseline 347957.3 341160 0.1157 
1st wave 368110.4 355374.4 0.4467 
2nd wave 361998.8 355946.9 0.8422 
Notes:  The measures of transfers are per household in units of 2002 pesos. T-test of difference in means 
computed clustering at the municipality level. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Under our several specifications above, we reject the hypothesis of complete 
consumption insurance, although we observe a high level of consumption smoothing 
among poor households in small villages in Colombia. Results show that (i) the growth rate 
of consumption is related to the growth rate of income, but certainly less so than what one 
would expect under the alternative hypothesis of a complete lack of risk-sharing tools, 
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suggesting that insurance is incomplete; (ii) food consumption is better insured than 
nonfood consumption; (iii) risk-pooling mechanisms at the community level insure food 
consumption but not nonfood consumption; (iv) transitory covariate shocks are not 
correlated with changes in consumption; and (v) household consumption growth is much 
more respondent to changes in aggregate municipality consumption than to changes in 
household income. Overall results are consistent with the partial insurance parameters 
proposed by Blundell et al. (2008) and are robust to different specifications.  
This study has also analyzed the impact of a CCT program on the ability of 
households to smooth consumption when faced with negative shocks. Results suggest that 
CCT programs are effective as risk-management instruments, especially if they are 
perceived as permanent. Overall, beneficiary households of FA appear to have lower 
absolute changes in consumption than control households when subject to idiosyncratic 
shocks, and there is no effect of the program on risk pooling within communities. Results 
show that beneficiary households of the program are able to protect food consumption 
from shocks such as crop loss and also to safeguard nonfood consumption when faced with 
the death of a household member or victimization by violence. The program has not been 
effective in insuring unemployment and illness shocks. In sum, Familias en Acción, despite 
not being a consumption insurance program, helps treated families to smooth 
consumption. 
Widely known theories of risk coping strategies in the literature, like the Pareto full 
risk sharing hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis, are clearly rejected by the 
data, giving support to partial insurance models. Estimation of the partial insurance 
parameters for transitory and permanent shocks reinforces some of our previous findings. 
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On average, households are able to self-insure consumption against transitory shocks by 
approximately 83% and against permanent shocks by about 45%. FA works as insurance 
for permanent shocks for food consumption but not for nonfood consumption. Insurance 
for permanent and transitory shocks is statistically significantly higher for educated 
households than for uneducated households. In conclusion, we observe that the partial 
insurance model for permanent and transitory shocks provides a better understanding of 
the degree of insurance than the full insurance model. 
Results raise questions about the precise mechanism by which poor households in 
Colombia cope with risk. That is, households do not rely exclusively on risk-sharing 
arrangements; instead, they appear to complement informal risk-sharing strategies with 
self-insurance strategies. Thus, the next step in this research project is to test how costly 
self-insurance strategies have been displaced by the program. More precisely, we will 
investigate whether the conditional aspect of the program prevents parents from using 
their children as risk coping instruments in response to shocks.  
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